Ruttan—Technology, Growth and Development
- Japanese innovation system—military industrial technonationalism
- Goods promoted for strategic reasons- later became crucial to trade policy
- Take-off in economic growth by 1880s—adapted borrowed technology
- Adopted and adapted English textile system
- 2 shifts/day, imported power loom, domestic production and repair shops
- 4 elements of Japanese national technology system---(textile, steel, etc.)
- Aggressive identification and transfer of tech from abroad
- Strong public support for adoption & diffusion of new tech
- Rapid adaptation of imported tech consistent with Japanese factor endowments and demand
- Development of capacity to innovate and manufacture
- Economic policies--- the “development state”
- Encourage high rates of savings/investment
- Discourage consumption
- “technonationalism”: based on belief that technology is fundamental part in national security—it must be indigenized, diffused and nurture by gov’t to make nation rich and strong
- Linked civilian and military tech
- Not so much after WWII though
- Japanese auto industry overtook Americanà smaller cars
- Used direct technology transfer: help from foreign engineers and ties with foreign producers and manufacturers
- And indirect technology transfer: import and reverse engineering
- 4 key principles: NEWà new conception of market, approach to production management, way to think about human resources and way of organizing based on teams and groups
- Developed flexible machinery—makes many parts
- Perfect first time quality, elimination of waste, continuous improvement of production process
- Lifetime employment guarantees—invest more in workers’ skills
- Organized production into groups
- “total quality control”—team given set of tasks then directed in how to do them—better response to change
- Product development teams—less time/effort but better
- Close grouping of suppliers and assemblers
- Important points: constant purpose towards improvement, total quality management, no need for inspection, no more awarding on basis of price, constantly improve production, training on the job, develop leadership, drive out fear, no departmental barriers, no slogans or targets for work force, no work standards/quotas, pride of workmanship, program of education, everyone work for transformation
- Japanese car exports to US ↑ as oil prices and power ↑
- Protectionismà establishing factories in US and Europe
- System targeted industries and attempted to catch up to leaders MITI system
- Ministry of Trade and Industry--- eroded over time
- “miracle” economic growth at first
- Slowed b/c of energy crisis and environmental concerns
- Later, more emphasis on science-based tech.—slowed growth
- Needs to modernize financial institutions and liberalize market economy
- Needs to create ideas instead of borrowing them
- Germany—backward economy became reversed with modern research university
- More focus on science, technology and education before mass production
- Tech transfer from Great Britain and US and new institutional arrangements helped advance knowledge and technology
- Many advancements compromised by WWI & WWII and aftermath
- Reconstruction in 1950s—universities didn’t recover though
- Auto industry developed later—copied Ford but not as cheap
- Volkswagen emerged (inspired by Hitler)
- Japanese cars moved ahead, responded with new luxury cars
- Japanese caught up again though
- Industrial cooperation and consolidation rather than competition
- Should be able to revive industrial dynamism though
- US system= mission oriented
- Concentrate on science-based tech development on limited # of industries
- German= diffusion oriented
- Support for broad-based tech development throughout industrial system
- Japan= both
- Development concentrated on effort in a few important sectors but new institutional arrangements for rapid diffusion
- 3 technological trajectory phases: emergence, consolidation, maturity
- Emergence success needs ability to do sophisticated R&D across broad front and flexible financial institutions for new opportunities
- Consolidation success needs ability to exploit new trajectories without getting actively involved in R&D and transfer resources
- Maturity—need skilled labor force/production engineering to exploit
- Don’t want concentration of capacity in any one stage
- All 3 tech development systems will have trouble with this
- Germany—move to consolidation/emergence of new trajectories?
- Japan—innovation in product tech?
- US—efficient enough to move from consolidation to maturity?
- Japanese are better imitators because: culture of creative imitation, stronger emphasis on process not product development, incremental improvement not breakthrough
- National technical innovational systems still important despite globalization
- Still substantial differences among national systems
- R&D dispersed differently in US, Japan, Germany
The National System for Innovation in
Technology Policy by Federal and State Governments
-Military R&D forbidden in
Federal ministry for research and technology created in 1955—main spender in federal government R&D.
-until the 1970s the Federal Ministry for Research and technology regarded as successful. The ministry accepted because perceived importance of government support for industrial R&D as the key in modernizing the structure of industry. But AEG and Siemens developed their nuclear reactors mainly with their own funds.
-in the 1980s the failure of some large projects became obvious even to the general public.
New policies: cost sharing between government and private sector to avoid firms carrying out a project even if they expect it to have no commercial use. So the ministry started to finance between 30-70%.
-encourage firms to participate in cooperative projects, supporting research contracted by firms to other firms or to government labs.
-fraunhofer-society: large organization carrying out applied research mainly on contract with clients in industry and government.
-indirect government support: tax credits, subsidies, special depreciate rates fro investments in R&D (up to certain limit), subsidies for R&D personnel in small enterprises. ALL DISCONTINUED. Since 1983 support for newly created technology-oriented enterprises.
-institutional support by federal government heavily concentrated on national labs.
-shift in areas of technology priority: largest share now goes to space tech response to participation in Western European collaborative projects. Nuclear energy second, reduced by 35% since 1981. Also reduction in non-nuclear energy technology. Support for aircraft technology grown by 63% since 1981 to 777million Dm per year. Airbus—although can be regarded as technical success, had not crossed threshold to a commercial business.
-One major challenge for reform is higher education sector: need for closer coordination of government tech policies and education (various levels) policies.
-another problem: internalization of business: trend of firms locating diff activities in diff countries à government policies more regional to provide infrastructure and support systems that keep the country attractive for high-wage business activities.
No comments:
Post a Comment