CLASS 21: Wednesday, November 14, Proliferation of WMD

Thwarting Nuclear Terrorism --Glaser

• Nuclear bomb that hit Hiroshima was made of Highly enriched Uranium (HEU) and had relatively simple “gun like mechanism” that triggered the explosion.
• There is fear the terrorist group could acquire HEU and produce a nuclear bomb similar to the “simple” atom bomb that hit Hiroshima
• HEU production is beyond state actors, but terrorist can acquire it through theft or black market
• 50 tons of HEU in civilian use, 1/3 of which is in poorly guarded Russian research nuclear facilities
• Best mean to prevent terrorist acquisition in the long run is to remove eliminate use of HEU
• à convert reactors to low enriched uranium (LEU) (not usable in weapons)
• 1990’s US and Russia began cooperating on retrieving and eliminating HEU stocks after HEU was stolen from Russian storage

• Spent HEU fuel (from nuclear reactor) can also be used to make bombs
• Spent HEU fuel is “self-protecting” for about 25 years: anyone close enough to manipulate the uranium will die within hours from the radiation.
• After 25 years can be manipulated (though still dangerous)
• US and Russia are (not very effectively) trying to get countries they provided with HEU to ship back the spent fuel
• After 9/11 pressure on Department of Energy (DOE) intensified
• Resulted in Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which is stepping up efforts to repatriate fresh and spent HEU fuel
• Irony of the situation: US spends billions on missile defense system (to protect from conventional nuclear attack) but spends only $70 million to repatriate HEU (which is the best way to protect us from terrorist nuclear attacks)

• Other sources of HEU fuel
• Critical assembly reactors (CAR)
• Mockup (small scale) reactors that test design of reactor
• In Russia, CAR often have reserves of HEU (until recently some reserves were unguarded)
• Pulsed reactors
• Research reactors often used by military to test effects of intense reactions (simulate nuke) on various materials
• Again reserve HEU is not well guarded

• Solutions:
• No more need for technologically obsolete research nuclear reactors: decommission them
• Increase funding and high level government support
• If task taken seriously, all civilian HEU could be removed in 5 to 8 years

"Kim's Big Fizzle", Scientific American (January 2007), pp. 18-20.

A summary of how nuclear implosion works: the detonators around the “core” sphere of plutonium or uranium go off at precisely the right time to create a spherical shock wave that compresses plutonium to 2-5 times, making the previously sub-critical mass super-critical. Even a mistake in timing of 100 nanoseconds can result in an explosion below optimum yield. The initiator is placed at the center of the bomb and ensures the neutron is released at the right time for optimum yield.

The desired plutonium is 239, but, especially if the plutonium came from nuclear fuel, too much plutonium 240 will be present. Plutonium 240 emits neutrons like crazy, so predetonation is likely to occur and a “fizzle” will occur

In the North Korean explosion, plutonium was used, but the bomb fizzled. As a result, it only yielded ½ a kiloton (500 tons of TNT equivalent). Most countries’ first nuclear bomb is between 5-25 kilotons, so the North Korean one was a relative failure (were expecting 4 kilotons). However, is still confirmed to be nuclear.

William J. Perry et al, "After the Bomb", New York Times (June 23, 2007), p. A23.

Focuses on what a state should do not to prevent a nuclear attack, but to deal with one afterwards – i.e. must make a contingency plan

1. the federal government, especially DoD, should take over and overrule any State authority

2. the federal government is the only one that can rationally deal with problem of radiation: everyone in the city center, if not killed by the blast, will die from radiation sickness (2-mile circle around ground zero)

3. the government should tell those around the fallout to stay in their basements for about three days

4. after this time period, people could leave their homes or stay depending on how much radiation they were willing to absorb – would not be lethal, but would increase risk of cancer from 20% (with no exposure) up to 30% (with greatest exposure)

5. same issue applies to first responders, therefore, government must notify people of how much radiation they will absorb

6. chance that terrorists will drop more weapons: evacuate other cities as much as possible to the countryside

7. government must figure out who is responsible for the bomb and cooperate with other governments if they are willing to cooperate (even if US thinks the terrorists got the bomb from Russia or Pakistan)

8. president, VP, speaker of House, majority leader of Senate, and chief justice of Supreme court (observer) should make plan of extreme surveillance measures that will be removed after crisis

9. can never be sure attack will not occur – must at least protect the existence of our constitutional government

David Albright, "When Will Iran Get the Bomb?", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July-August, 2006), pp. 26-37.

The CIA says Iran could likely get the bomb within the next 10 years. It all depends on how good their technology is.

Worst-case scenarios

If Iran decides to obtain highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use

in a nuclear weapon, its two most likely paths would be to develop

a clandestine or a “breakout” centrifuge enrichment capability. In

either worst-case estimate, the earliest Iran would have enough HEU

for a nuclear weapon would be in 2009.

Beginning of 2006–End of 2007

If the construction of a secret plant with 1,500–1,800 centrifuges

had begun in early 2006, its completion would not be likely before

the end of 2007.

Beginning of 2008–End of 2008

It would take approximately one year for this plant to produce

enough HEU for a nuclear weapon.

Beginning of 2009–Months later

Converting the HEU into weapon components would take a few

months, meaning the earliest Iran could have a nuclear weapon

would be sometime in 2009.

Late 2006–2009 or 2010

Iran has said it will begin installing 3,000 centrifuges in its

production-scale plant in late 2006. If there are no major delays,

this module could be complete in 2009 or 2010.

Months later

Centrifuges in the production-scale plant could be reconfigured

relatively easily to make HEU and could produce enough material

for a weapon in as little as a few months. Converting the HEU into

weapon components would take an additional few months.

Alibek, Ken

Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World—Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It

Overview:

The article discusses a biological weapon—anthrax—spill from a secret lab in Sverdlovsk during the Soviet Regime. Anthrax leaked out in April1979 after a worker failed to replace the air-filter which was the only thing containing the anthrax inside the secret lab. The accident was evidence of the Soviet violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Although they tried to cover it up, they failed.

Outline

1. Outbreak in April 1979

1. Worker fails to replace air-filter; anthrax enters into the night air

2. In the next few days all the workers on the night shift of a ceramic-making plant across the street from the facility fell ill; within a week nearly all of them were dead

2. Cover-Up

1. The Soviet called it a ‘natural outbreak’ and blamed it on “bad meat” sold on the black market

1. To make it more convincing, they rounded up and killed dogs that had supposedly eaten the bad meat from the markets
2. They also put vendors selling the ‘supposedly bad meat in jail’

3. Background on Sverdlovsk

1. Soviet military industrial complex

1. Built tanks, nuclear rockets, and other armaments as well as biological weapons

4. Total damage done

1. 96 people stricken and 66 died

2. ‘small epidemic’ continued for months

5. Other forms of anthrax

1. Cutaneous form of anthrax

1. Common; spread through contact with domestic cattle, sheep and goats by coming in contact w/open sores, cuts, etc.; treatable
2. Pulmonary anthrax
1. Most deadly; can be treated by injecting penicillin into blood before symptoms appear
1. symptoms: shortness of breath, distinctive dark swellings along chest and neck
3. Anthrax 836
1. Most powerful strain which was collected from rats; viral strain developed due to a previous outbreak which leaked into the sewage systems
4. Intestinal anthrax
1. Claimed by KGB to have caused the problem in Sverdlovsk, but this was untrue
1. accounts for less than 1% of cases

6. Soviet and Anthrax Production

1. Three cities: Sverdlovsk (later moved to Stepnogorsk in northern Kazakhstan), Penza, and Kurgan

2. Biological weapons in high demand and considered more useful than dynamite

7. Author meets Killer

1. Author works for a plant where he meets Nikolai Chernyshov, the man responsible for the Sverdlovsk incident

2. Chernyshov not punished because it would mean a loss in the confidentiality of certain events and persons
3. Lack of responsibility and culture of ‘hide any damage or accidents’ developed
1. Example where man drops a can of toxin on the ground and never tells anyone, but has the whole area quickly disinfected; no one gets sick

8. Getting to the Truth

1. Nine years later a group of Soviet medical experts arrive in the US to reveal the ‘truth’ of the 1979 event; yet they gave the same account/excuses as before but with more details

2. Author refuses to sign away on ‘proposed lie’ to America
3. Americans received and believed the story about ‘bad meat’!
4. May 1993à interview w/ Boris Yelstin finally shed some light on the true events
5. Yet in 1998, more articles published on re-affirming the ‘lie/story’ on ‘bad meat

Chapter 8 Progress

Overview

Talks about author’s job to improve the Stepnogorsk plant/research center to a degree that would allow it to replace Sverdlovsk.

--Anthrax 836 = powerful strain for use in warfare

--author’s assignment: created the world’s most efficient assembly line for the mass production of weaponized anthrax

--secretly transformed the a plant formerly used to make pesticides and ferilizers into one of six biowarfare facilities in the Soviet Union used to mobilize special production in the event of war; kept this secret from workers (or at least tried and had great success)

--ready to create strains of anthrax, tularemia and plague!

--Regan’s election to the White House led to huge mobilization and a heightened arms-race as many thought war imminent, especially since the US-backed forces in Afghanistan were killing Soviets and missiles were deployed by the U.S. in Europe that could reach Soviet soil

--author so nervous his ‘teeth grinding’ would keep his wife up at night; high security at plant he was in charge of

--counterintelligence chief left him uneasy

(96-99)

Anthrax

"By the time we finished our construction program at Stepnogorsk, the facility looked like the mountain of metal Tarasenko had warned me about." One building to analyze the decay rate and dissemination capacities of aerosol mixtures contained in germ bombs. The second building was for animal testing.

Process of "weaponizing" anthrax began with grains of freeze-dried bacteria kept in stoppered vials.

One of the central challenges of bio-weaponeering is to find the right temperatures at which different pathogenic microorganisms can grow rapidly without being cooked to death. (Similar to vaccine creation.)

"A bioweaponeer works with recipes." The raw ingredients are similar, but quantities and combinations of nutrient media, heat, and time vary. If it overheats, you have sto start all over! Each generation of bacteria is transferred into a larger vessel. Once they reach maximum concentration, they are passed through a centrifuge to be concentrated as much as thirty times further. (This centrifuge resembles the separators used to make milk... The tech. itself was produced by a dairy plant in Tula, south of Moscow.)

The pathogen then has to be mixed with additives to stabilize it over a long period (another "patented" element of the process?). The final formulation is sent through underground pipes to a building where it's filtered into the munitions carrier. (Likens the machines that execute this task to those used in soft drink bottling plants!) By 1987, the combined production capacity of the anthrax lines was nearly 5,000 tons a year.

(107-115)

Smallpox

Viruses: Structurally simpler than bacteria, but are capable of annihilating the most sophisticated biological systems. Virulence, contagiousness. Programmed for its own procreation, but it needs a host cell.

Human immune system as "an army with scouts and infantrymen, naval and air power, a sophisticated information network, and a carefully delineated command structure."

T-cells: The scouts, on the lookout for foreign substances.

Of all viruses, smallpox has left the oldest and the deepest scars. Ravaged 18th century Europe, decimated the Native Americans. Comes from the pox family of viruses, which assaults the upper respiratory tract. Stages:

1. high fever, vomiting, headache, strange stiffness
2. small spots develop, rash around face.
3. rash spreads, painful blisters
4. scabs linger, dry, and fall off, leaving scars
5. sometimes fatal (3-4 days)

1796 - British physician Edward Jenner injects an 8-year-old with material taken from the lesions of a milkmaid who had contracted a mild form of pox virus from cows. Two months later, he inoculated the boy with smallpox, but he didn't contract the disease. Which was good, because that could've been awkward.

1980 - WHO announces eradication of smallpox; no more need for immunization programs. Two stockpiles left (Atlanta and Moscow).

Moscow proposed the crusade against smallpox but simultaneously developed it as a weapon. In 1981, they renewed intense work on a better version of the weapon!

1947: first smallpox weapons factory outside the ancient cathedral town of Zagorsk. They injected the virus into chicken eggs, let it take over the host, and poured the resulting liquid into huge vats. (This is all actually in the text by the way.) Hundreds of thousands of nearby collective farms were consigned to Zagorsk's weapons-assembly lines. In 1959, there was a breakout of incredibly virulent strain of smallpox in India, so it was collected and reproduced in the USSR.

A 20-ton stockpile of smallpox in the USSR was renewed annually.

Some scientists consider smallpox an unlikely weapon, however, since humans are the virus's only natural hosts, and since quarantine and vaccination could preclude an epidemic.

The Allies gave up on weaponizing viruses, but not the USSR. They were valuable munitions; you could do a lot with just a little. But the Allies efficiently produced vaccines while "we" inefficiently produced the virus.

(163-167)

The Plague

Nothing really new here... same kind of story that he tells in the other two parts. Talks about boubles and how bad the plague is, then criticizes the US for giving up on what is actually a relatively easy process of culturing various forms of the plague and maintaining its killing capacity. The USSR "persevered."

The future of arms control—Levi and O’Hanlon.

Chapter 1

· Cold war arms control:

o Removed areas of possible military competition that could have been hard for either superpower to resist had the other not done so too (i.e. outer space, Antarctica)

o Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty reduced danger of crisis turning into hot war

· However, countries later came to testing nuclear weapons, despite existence of regulations.

o Eventually, US rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was rescinded as well

· Bush administration proposed to prohibit access to nuclear power technologies that could also be used in nuclear weapon programs by countries not already possessing technologies

o Adopted the option of preventive war for thwarting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (strategy: preemption)

· Arms control cannot provide absolute guarantees that countries will not acquire or sell dangerous materials, but can provide disincentives to such action

o Make it more difficult to carry them out

o Make it easier to detect illicit activity

o Thus establishing predicates for coercive action

· Arms control should be viewed as a complement to coercive action, not as a substitute for it

· Universal standards do not directly dissuade extremist states from pursuing weapons of mass destruction, but they can help the US and international community confront them when they do, making it harder for them to succeed

· Arms control should focus on nuclear and biological arms to prevent their spread to most dangerous actors, extremist states and terrorist organizations à reduce inclination to seek dangerous arms and increase willingness to stop countries so inclined

o Provide early warning of when and where outlaw regimes acquire weapons

o Integrate coercive enforcement action more intimately into its structure, to respond to situations in which extremist regimes or terrorist groups are detected pursuing illicit weapons and to deter them entirely

o Harmonize with broader American foreign policy to help most states feel greater confidence in their own security

· Arms control needs priorities: should attempt to prevent spread of dangerous materials

· Arms control should produce transparency and early warning: goal of arms control should be to enable early detection of dangerous detections, by means of cooperative or coercive tools

· Arms control should be a complement to military force

· Arms control must address security of nations that do not have weapons of mass destruction:

o US and allies should create new security guarantees and perhaps new alliance systems, tailored to specific circumstances, for democratic, peaceful countries

o Arms control explicitly linked to security policy

· Arms Control Criteria for today’s world:

o Goal: deter proliferation before it occurs

o Arms control must encompass not only cooperative arrangements among adversaries, but also cooperative arrangements among friends

o E.g. US now pursues arms control with Russia to keep Russia’s weapons out of the hands of terrorists

o Future of arms control: based on problem of weak states and dangerous non-state actors, not competition between great powers

Chapter 2

Traditional strategic arms control not as important for the future
Argument for traditional strategic arms control—irrelevant now
Weapon can stabilize relationship
Arms reductions must be verifiable or transparent
Advances in US-USSR relationship may make it easier to progress in other relationships
Continued reductions can help diminish important of nuclear weapons for security
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—end of complete disarmament is unrealistic
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is worthwhile—not necessary though
Same benefits if we condemn testing
Shouldn’t restrict arms in space
State of nuclear relations among great states is sound---no upset
Arms control okay right now (US and Russia)—little gain from pushing it farther
Proliferation increase not likely if downward trends of US/Rus. Continue
Can’t have arsenal too low though—China might try to compete
China has more to worry about with US (over Taiwan) than Russia does
Size and character of US missile defense WILL matter now & in future
Important to abstain for nuclear weapons and downplay their role in US doctrine
If not---could lead to more proliferation
Seen as militarily important or weakened taboo against them
4 primary types of new nuclear weapons proposed:
Low-yield weapons, earth-penetrating weapons, enhanced radiation weapons, and agent-defeat weapons
Low-yield weapons: bombs that explode in air- power 100x smaller than Hiroshima
Could fill gap between least powerful nuclear weapons & most powerful conventional weapons
US unlikely to launch nuclear weapons w/o these b/c too much damage
Scary enemy but are a more credible threat
However, void doesn’t really appear to be there-not really valid argument
Earth-penetrating weapons: “bunker-busters”-not fall out free but reduce it
Increase destructive depth—could double that of current arsenal
Better deterrence & could destroy WMD attack coming from deep bunker
BUT: only increase by factor of 2—enemy could easily dig deeper
Fallout reduction only useful if between far and urban area-unlikely
Enhanced radiation weapons: “neutron bombs”
Kill enemies with radiation but preserve physical infrastructure
Considered (and rejected) for against Soviets—not rational today though
Agent-defeat weapons
Designed to penetrate facilities holding chemical/biological weapons and incinerate them—prevents spread
Need really good intelligence to destroy targets
Might actually eject some of the agents before neutralizing them
Conventional weapons could probably do this too
US should emphasize conventional ability and that it won’t strike first
CTBT—signing would show belief that nuclear arms less valuable
Bans all nuclear explosions by member states or within their jurisdictions
GOALS: prevent non-nuclear states from getting nuclear weapons and prohibit weapons states from improving arsenals
Stop development -not crude weapons—get India, Israel, Pakistan to join?
Needs to be ratified by all members of UN conference on disarmament or states with nuclear reactors (44)
Opponent arguments:
Endangers safety/reliability of US nuclear arsenal
Not a verifiable treaty
False sense of security—if want to test may withdraw or violate
Prevents US from developing new warhead types
BUT: No real need to test though
Ability to cheat severely limited and hard to enforce
One possibility of arms control: de-alert forces
Worries that de-alerting forces will lead to weakened deterrence
Argument for de-alerting only some forces
In terms of space, US stands to lose the most from weaponization
Most against it--- China, UN, Russia
Some US defense planners think it will ensure US dominance
Some argue space is already partially weaponized--long-range rockets, etc.
Space as a sanctuary???
US looks to have wide range of offensive/defensive tech for space in future--- show we agree to restraints now then?
Are treaties even worth negotiating?
Need confidence-building measures and informal understandings
OVERALL: shouldn’t be top priority of the US in the future
Should try to keep the status quo for as long as possible
Prohibitions--- ban all activities in space in terms of ASATs all together
Flaws: hard to ensure something isn’t ASAT
Cant stop some types of missile defense from being used as ASAT
Not sure US will benefit from ASAT ban forever
Better to ban Earth-attack weapons in space
Could also do temporary prohibitions, bans on testing/deployment above set altitude, ban on ASATs that produce debris
Confidence-building measures: establish rules for using military assets
Ex: keep-out zones around satellites—hard to enforce though
Wouldn’t really limit military capabilities
Good idea but not worth a great deal of time
Advance notice of space launches—makes sense
Questionable though—payloads not always obviously for ASATs
Marginally useful—don’t stop but make weaponizing more difficult
Informal, unilateral (but possibly reciprocated) restraints
Quicker and more flexible--- buy time
Applicable mostly to R&D
BUT if change would cause alarm and risk

Chapter 3. Preventing Nuclear proliferation

• Perfect defense against nuclear attack is not technically feasible. Meaningful mitigation of consequences is impossible
• Today little danger either US or Russia will use nukes. Primary worry over terrorists.
• Current control of spread of nuclear arms flawed in 4 ways:

1. too little warming of proliferation developments
2. lack of means for enforcing agreements
3. little incentive for states to forgo nukes
4. do too little to stop terrorists, as opposed to states, from acquiring nukes.

• All states should be required to accept tougher broader inspections.

• Coercive dimension of arms control must be extended building on bush’s proliferation security initiative. Extend agreement to bind all states through a security council resolution.
• Agree in advance on when coercive instruments ranging from interdiction to sanctions to force should be used. And force should not be used strictly as a last resort.
• Give states reason to comply: rewards that don’t address national security in states will not be effective. US should develop alliances and security guarantees with more countries—require major commitments and investments but broadly consistent with American foreign policy of post WWII era.
• This would not preclude use of nonaggression pledges as part of nonproliferation deals in difficult circumstances.
• Important to better secure existing nuclear materials as well. Should declare a deterrent policy promising extremely severe repercussions for any country found to have export weapons or materials to countries that would provide terrorists with nuclear weapons.

The ultimate terrorists—Jessica Stern

Pg. 1-10.

• A nuclear attack on the Empire State building or elsewhere might evoke measures that will violate civil rights. Within days the American way of life might change substantially.
• Fear of radiation might cause panic, which could lead to death (accidents from people trying to rush out of the city even w/o evacuation)
• US department of energy predicts that nuke would cuase very few deaths from cancer but economic and psychological damage formidable—people stay indoors for undefined period afterward to avoid exposure to fallout.
• Biological weapons have potential to be as deadly as nukes but easier to accomplish. Compare anthrax (100 kilograms) would kill up to 3 million people, where hydrogen bomb could kill between 600,000 and 2 million.
• Vulnerable societies: modern societies are particularly suspetible to weapons that are capable of killing many people at once. In modern societies terrorists go unnoticed because of personal isolation. Internet provides easy way for terrorists to spread information around the world.
• US may have contributed to terrorist violence by training and financing the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan’s war with the Soverit Union in the 1980s, leaving militants dispersed.
• Christian Patiots growing in number, showing signs of interest in biological weapons. Survivalists and white supremacists implicated in three separate cases involving biological agents in 1995.
• Why now? 5 risks increased the risk of terrorist attacks against civilian targets:
1. valuable to terrorists seeking to conjure sense of divine retribution, evoke dread or retaliate against states that have used WMD in the past.
2. changing motivations: religious groups becoming more common and are more violent than secular groups.
3. black market offers weapons and components and knowhows after the breakup of the soviet union.
4. chemical and biological weapons proliferating in states known to sponsor terrorism. China Russia and N Korea are exporting equipment intended for benign purposes but could be used to manufacture WMD.
5. advances in technology have made terrorism with weapons of mass destruction easier to carry out. The Internet, fermenting equipment (although tech also makes hunting down terrorism easier).

• Despite these developments terrorist use of WMD likely to remain rare.

• While the probability of WMD terrorism is low the expected cost is devastating.