Thursday, November 29, 2007

Class 22 Nov. 19 Tech, Terrorism and Security

Mark Williams, “The Total Information Awareness Project Lives On”

  • In April 2006, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the organization advocating citizens’ digital rights, gave evidence supporting its class-action lawsuit which accused AT&T of giving the National Security Agency (NSA = world’s largest espionage organization) access to Americans’ telephone and Internet communications.
  • In December 2005, it was revealed that after 9/11, Bush authorized an NSA surveillance program which included warantless electronic eavesdropping in the US.
  • Many said Bush’s administration violated both the 4th Amendment (protecting citizens against unwarranted search or seizure) as well as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which requires warrants for eavesdropping to be approved by a special court.
  • TIA = supposedly defunct Total Information Awareness project (created by DARPA to develop advanced IT to counter terrorists but was closed down by Congress in 2003 because people thought it was too “Orwellian”); Feb. 2006 = found that technologies from the TIA had been acquired by the NSA.
  • In 2004 the TIA was effectively killed, but a classified document apparently preserved funding for TIA’s component technologies, as long as they were transferred to other government agencies (Congress said they should be used only for military or foreign intelligence purposes against non-US citizens).
  • Because of this, the ARDA (Advanced Research and Development Activity) acquired two TIA components: the Information Awareness Prototype System (renamed “Basketball”), and Genoa II (renamed “Topsail”).
  • So, the question arose as to whether the NSA was using these technologies, but Attorney General Gonzales maintained that Article II of the Constitution gave the President authority to conduct such monitoring, as well as that although the NSA sidestepped requirements to get warrants in some cases, FISA still worked well. He also said FISA is inapplicable in some cases, even though retroactive warrants can be issued.
  • This implies that it isn’t just that the government may at times want to act quickly. Because FISA demands that “probable cause” be shown to issue a warrant, NSA’s surveillance would not been applicable.
  • The EEF’s lawsuit shows that NSA has access to the switches and records of most or all of the nation’s top telecommunications companies. Basically, they can have access to whatever they want = pretty creepy.
  • However, it has not yet been proved that TIA technologies acquired by ARDA have actually been used by NSA for domestic surveillance (as opposed to only for overseas intelligence gathering). But, the technologies used by NSA seem very similar to Basketball and Topsoil (which is more important than whether or not they are the specific TIA technologies).
  • Question = how should data-mining technologies like those of the TIA be regulated in a democracy? FISA now inadequate because of new terrorist threats.


Robert Alvarez, “What About the Spent Fuel?

  • Until recently, fears about nuclear power plant attacks focused on reactor containment buildings, but now center on spent fuel ponds because they can catch fire and are in much more vulnerable buildings.
  • The ponds are usually rectangular or L-shaped, are about 40 feet deep and are made of reinforced concrete walls about 4 or 5 feet thick with stainless steel liners.
  • According to one engineer, the most serious risk is loss of the pool water that cools and shields the highly radioactive spent fuel assemblies. This water loss could expose spent fuel, leading to a fire, and consequences potentially worse than a reactor meltdown.
  • Several things could cause a loss of pool water: leakage, evaporation, siphoning, pumping, aircraft impact, earthquake, accidental or deliberate drop of a fuel transport cask, reactor failure, or an explosion inside or outside the pool building.
  • Industry officials say personnel would have enough time to activate an alternate cooling system before the spent fuel caught fire, but if the water level dropped to just a few feet above the spent fuel, the radiation doses would be lethal.
  • Over the years, the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) has made important concessions.
  • It is now reviewing its safety and security policies in order to ensure better protection of nuclear power plants and fuel facilities. One problem = space for spent fuel is already running out.
  • Spent fuel ponds were only meant to be temporary and to hold only small fractions of what they currently do.

Lowenthal, “Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy” p. 109-132

  • Despite the perceived excitement of secret operations, analysis is the main duty of the intelligence community as it provides civil and military policy makers with vital information.
  • Many agree that the consistent flow and delivery of intelligence can have a numbing effect on policy makers, so it is important to make itself stan out from other sources in this constant stream of information.
  • This can be achieved in two ways: 1) emphasize the unique nature of the intelligence sources (not preferred by intelligence officers) and 2) produce analysis that stands out on its won merits by adding value (i.e. timeliness of intelligence products, ability of the community to tailor products to specific policy makers’ needs, and objectivity of the analysis).
  • Difficult to prescribe how to produce value-added intelligence or to measure how often it is produced because intelligence officers and their policy clients can’t agree on what adds value in an analysis

Major Themes:

  • Formal Requirements: In the ideal intelligence-process model, policy makers would consider main/formal requirements before communicating them to intelligence managers, but such a formal process has not been the norm in the history of the intelligence community. Some people say, however, that a less formal process is actually better than the ideal one because most requirements are well known and don’t need to be defined to managers. What is most important about requirements is assigning priority among them as opposed to defining the issues that need to be covered.
  • Current vs. Long-Term Intelligence: Current intelligence = reports and analysis on issues that might not extend more than a week or two into the future and is the product most often requested and seen by policy makers. It always predominates over other types of intelligence, but this degree of predominance varies with time (increases during a crisis or war). Many intelligence analysts are frustrated with this predominance because they have developed an expertise in a certain area and want to write longer-term analyses that look beyond current demands. Policy makers, however, are not really interested in these types of reports because of lack of time. There is some middle ground that exists, but because of the limited number of analysts, managers must decide where to put their resources, which usually ends up being in current intelligence products.
  • Briefings: form of current intelligence; many are routine and take place first thing in the morning. One of the main advantages = intelligence officer’s ability to interact directly with the policy maker, get a better idea of the policy maker’s preferences and reactions to the intelligence, which replaces the need for a formal feedback mechanism. Risks = too short. Briefers must be sure of their information and not afraid to say “I don’t know.” They must always be careful to be objective.
  • Crisis vs. the Norm: one way in which requirements are set is in response to a crisis. Crisis-driven requirements represent the ultimate victory of current over long-range intelligence needs. Analytical managers have to create or preserve some minimal amount of expertise in case of the sudden eruption of a less important issue which moves to the top of policy makers’ concerns.
  • The Wheat vs. Chaff Problem: part of collection, but ultimately an analytical issue. There is much information that is collected but doesn’t get processed an exploited. The intelligence community has adopted some analytical software which helps, but no major breakthroughs have been made. Sifting through information does not just mean going through individual reports, etc., but involves seeing the mass of material in its entirety. Problem = no shortcuts.
  • Analyst Fungibility: when requirements change or a crisis breaks out, analysts must shit to areas of greater need, but not every analyst can work on every issue. Analysts are less easily interchanged or replaced than technical collection systems. This fungibility or agility of analysts relies on three things: talents and backgrounds when analysts are recruited, their training and education within the intelligence community, and the management of their careers. *global coverage = intelligence officers acknowledged requirement to cover any and all issues. Problem = this term may leave the impression among policy makers of more depth and breadth than is actually available.
  • Analyst Training: Although training can give new analysts a sense of how the community works, nothing can replace experience on the job. Minimum skills for all analysts = knowledge of one or more specific fields, appropriate language skills, and a basic ability to express themselves in writing. Analysts must also learn objectivity.
  • Managing Analysts: Major concern = developing career tracks. Analysts need time to develop true expertise in a certain field, but can experience stagnation if covering the same issue for too long. Solution = rotating analysts among assignments, but this can lead to possibility of never gaining expertise in one field. Promotions should come as a result of merit, not time served.
  • Analysts’ Mindset: common traits included mirror imaging, or the assumption that other leaders, states, and groups share the analyst’s same motivations or goals, and clientelism, which is a flaw that occurs when analysts become so immersed in their subjects (usually after working on them too long) that they lose their ability to view issues with the necessary criticism; another is layering, which is the use of judgments made in one analysis as the basis for judgments made in another without carrying over the uncertainties that may be involved
  • On the Ground Knowledge: analysts have varying degrees of direct knowledge about the nations they are analyzing, or may have less contact with the senior foreign officials who they write about than policy makers do; this distance can be costly in terms of accuracy for an analysis (especially terrorists, because there is very small if any direct contact); also, analysts may want to sound more experienced than they are, which can cause problems in their analyses; groupthink is another problem, in which policy makers rely on the consensus and don’t listen to outlying but possibly correct analyses
  • Analytical Issues:
  • Competitive vs. Cooperative Analysis: competitive analysis is very important to the US intelligence community, but there has been a desire to bring together analysts from different agencies and disciplines to work together on major current issues; already the intelligence community has formed task forces to deal with certain important issues, such as the Balkans task force and the National Counterterrorism Center after 9/11; issues, however, include duration and inflexibility
  • Dealing with Limited Information: analysts rarely know everything about a topic; they can deal with this by flagging the problem so the policy client is aware of it, or by arranging for more collection of information if time permits, or by including more analysts to work on the problem
  • Conveying Uncertainty: most analysts shy away from saying “we don’t know,” so they can use a numerical formulation (1 in 10 chance, etc.) to help describe the possibility of an event
  • Indications and Warnings: give policy makers advance warning of significant, usually military, events, and it relies on the fact that all militaries operate according to certain regular schedules, forms and behaviors. Analysts look for anything that seems out of the ordinary or any new or unexpected activity.

Class 24 Nov. 26 Science and Technology Policy in the US

William Bonvillian, “Meeting the New Challenge to US Economic Competitiveness”

· While it seemed a world-dominating Goliath in the mid- and late- 90s, the US now faces major structural challenges and a number of new Davids around the globe, led by China and India.

· The economy regained strength during 2003 and 2004, but created no new jobs. The manufacturing sector’s share of the economy is continuing to shrink, and the growing service sector is seeing global competition in low-skilled service jobs, and is starting to see it in high-skilled service jobs as well.

· Underlying these developments is a major demographic shift – an upcoming rapid increase in the nonproductive population of seniors, which will put much strain on the Social Security System and pose a big national problem, inhibiting the country’s future ability to invest in growth.

· 70s and 80s = US faced strong competition from Japan, focused in the manufacturing sector and particularly consumer electronics, cars and IT. The US lost dominance in consumer electronics but saved its car industry (in part through quotes on imported Japanese vehicles). SUVS became the new platform for the US car industry, and advanced computer chips and software kept the US in the lead in some sectors of IT.

· US benefited from investments in science education and from major Cold War federal R&D investments. It also explored private-public collaboration to bridge the gap between government supported research and private sector development.

· DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) became a unique organization focused on moving revolutionary technology from the research to the development stage.

· Excessive enthusiasm for IT fueled a stock market bubble, but real gains in productivity occurred and translated into widespread societal gains.

· Today, the US faces a very different competitive situation against China. While Japan was a high-wage, high-cost, advanced technology economy, China is low-wage, low-cost but still has an advanced technology economy, making it a much more complicated competitor.

· Like Japan, China has manipulated its currency to gain advantage (strategy = undervalue its own currency to stimulate exports and buy US government bonds to create leverage in US policymaking).

· The markets are also different than in the 80s – then the competition was over manufacturing, while today most sectors, including services, face direct competition, and the increasing fusion of services and manufacturing is creating a new field of battle. Focus is shifting from machines to talent and knowledge.

· One school of economic theory says that technological innovation accounts for more than half of historical US economic growth, making it a far more significant factor than capital and labor supply, which are the dominant factors in traditional economic analysis. The theory says that new technologies ignite a chain reaction of related innovation that leads to a surge in productivity throughout the economy.

· This theory may be restrictive, however, because while we have almost a century worth of data for capital and labor supply, we have little to understand the dynamics of innovation-based growth. We can look at macro-data, but this is inherently misleading.

· Despite lack in innovation metrics, the underlying logic of growth theory is convincing, and if innovation is indeed the big factor in growth then the nation must innovate its way to continuing competitive advantage.

· The country cannot wait for the results of a perfected innovation model, so it must go on what it already has to begin strengthening a few key links of the innovation chain: R&D funding, talent, organization of S&T, innovation infrastructure, manufacturing and services.

· R&D funding: has been in long-term decline in the US and is currently at 1% of GDP, with life sciences receiving more funding than physical sciences; the congressional appropriations system is falling apart, which threatens the viability of federal R&D capacity; industry R&D spending, which focuses on development, cannot substitute for federal investment in research. Much political action will be necessary to change the current trend. Without increased funding, the nation with have to choose between two strategies for making the most of declining research funds: 1) random disinvestment or 2) a conscious program of niche investment (focus on quality, not quantity).

· Talent: “prospector theory” = number of capable prospectors a nation or region fields corresponds to its level of technological discovery and innovation; a nation shouldn’t try to fit its talent base to what it estimates the size of the economy will be, but rather the talent base will determine the size of the economy; but, despite decades of discussion about the importance of educating more scientists and engineers, the percentage of US students entering these fields is not increasing; the No Child Left Behind Act should help make science and math courses more rigorous, but it needs to be backed up with adequate funding for this to happen; because improving the science education system will take at least a decade, the US must continue to rely on a large number of foreign-born scientists and engineers

· Organization of science and technology: the US has had the same organizational structure since the 50s; until the creation of the Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, DARPA in 1957 was the last major new R&D agency; over the decades, solo inventors have been mainly replaced by complex organizational networks linking industry, universities and government research agencies

· Innovation Infrastructure: research progress must be coupled with an effective infrastructure to quicken the pace of innovation; government has an historic role in supporting this infrastructure

· Manufacturing and services: reliable and cost-competitive products must be manufactured to reap the final reward of innovation; manufacturing remains the currency of the global economy, as selling high-valued goods globally is still the way to gain wealth; however, US trade deficit in goods is rapidly increasing; both low end and high end manufacturing are moving abroad, talent erosion in the manufacturing base is a big concern; the US will only gain back a comparative advantage in manufacturing sectors if it updates its processes

· The US has the most flexible and resilient economy in the world; however, it needs innovation in order to keep growing, and needs the political will to implement innovation-encouraging policies

Henry Kelly et al, "Flying Blind: The Rise, Fall and Possible Resurrection of Science Policy Advice in the United States":

  • P. 1-10:
  • The need for effective science and technology advice continues to increase while the infrastructure for providing such help is in a state of crisis. Lacking good advice, the nation may not act on problems until they are costly and difficult to solve.
  • Main issue: if Congress or the President don’t want objective scientific advice, no institutional solution can fix the problem because there is no way to force the President to meet with scientific advisors or make Congress create legislation based on given scientific analysis.
  • Options are considered in 3 categories: 1) strengthening science and technology advice for Congress, 2) strengthening science and technology advice for the President, and 3) ensuring that individual citizens are NGOs have the information needed to conduct their own analyses so they can participate in public debate.
  • Recommendations given by report:
  • 1) Congress: the gap created by the loss of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1996 has not yet been filled. Recommendation = start a significant effort with OTA’s ability to assemble external expertise and conduct detailed analysis of complex technical subjects as a distinct organization within GAO reporting directly to the GAO director.
  • 2) President: management of S&T issues at the executive level is haphazard; recommendations: establish a strong National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) managed by a civilian executive secretary appointed by the President, formalizing the role of a Presidential S&T advisor; reauthorize the Office of S&T as an office that would secure independent advice through independent advisory boards, conduct periodic assessments of S&T policy issues, and at least one advisory board should have terms of six years to ensure continuity between administrations
  • 3)Public Information: good government depends of holding public officials accountable to the public they represent, which means individuals and independent private organizations must be able to evaluate the running of federal programs; recommendations: remove controls on unclassified scientific information, create new internal checks on secrecy, adopt an affirmative disclosure policy and mandate routine publication of advisory committee reports.
  • There are two types of complaints: 1) policy decisions are being made without the benefit of serious, timely, unbiased analysis and 2) high quality analysis is available but ignored, distorted or suppressed.
  • P. 27-44: The Current State of Science Advice
  • In spite of widespread recognition for scientific and engineering advice outside of the Department of Defense, designing effective institutions has been difficult.
  • Advice to the President: in 1956 President Eisenhower created the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) to provide advice on a wide range of S&T matters. In 73, however, Nixon fired his science advisor and disbanded the PSAC because of political disagreements. In 76, Congress created the current Office of Science and Technology Policy, which basically forced the President to have some form of formal science advice. The President selects his advisors. The National Security Advisor (NSA) has far greater influence because there has never been doubt that Presidents need security advice.
  • Office of S&T Policy: director and no more than 4 associate directors, all approved by the Senate; director “provides advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest levels of government”; the OSTP also studies trends in science, initiates studies and reports to Congress and the President on annual accomplishments; it has no specific budget authority; the office is further weakened by the perception that it is partly a lobby for research funding rather than being a vital part of the White House decision making team; basically, the role of the office depends on the relationship between the president and his director; under the current President Bush, the rule of the OSTP has declined
  • The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was created in 1993 by President Clinton and is a cabinet-level council that “is the principal means for the President to coordinate science and technology policies across the Federal Government.”; it has very little authority, and while the President is the nominal chair of the NSTC, Bush has never attended a meeting; reasons for weakness = most agencies and departments have far better ways of influencing the policy process than working through NSTC and its effective chair, the President’s science advisor; in comparison, the National Security Council and its Advisor are much more influential; another weakness = nature of NSTC’s “product,”; the NSC’s “product” is security always, but NSTC’s product rarely ends up being actual science policy, but an agriculture product, or an energy product
  • President’s Council of Advisors on S&T: senior group of non-governmental advisors, PCAST; role and access to the President depend heavily on his preferences
  • The Critical Technologies Institute: a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRCD) chartered by Congress in 1992 and renamed the S&T Policy Institute (STPI) in 1998; funded through the National Science Foundation, but acts under the guidance of OSTP; through it, Congress wanted to develop publicly available analyses of key S&T issues, but it never really reached this goal
  • The National Science Board (NSB): established in 1950 along with NSF to provide oversight for the NSF research portfolio, but its mandate is open-ended, potentially including almost any aspect of the US R&D effort; considered a part of the NSF and is not a principal resource for the President.
  • Advice to Congress: 535 individual clients who all have slightly different perspectives, as well as a large number of different committees and subcommittees, meaning what works for advising just the President will not work with Congress; the fragmentation of responsibilities in Congress makes it extremely difficult to develop anything near a coherent treatment of research priorities
  • Office of Technological Assessment: created in 1972 because Congress felt it was not getting appropriate S&T advice; designed to be bipartisan, but many Republicans felt that the organization had a Democratic bias, creating much tension; the OTA was eliminated in 1994
  • Congressional Research Service (CRS): began as the Congressional Reference Service in 1914; provides all congressional offices with nonpartisan information and research, and gives immediate answers to questions and short-term studies; most of its work is done in response to requested topics; has an excellent reputation for impartiality
  • Government Accountability Office (GAO, formerly General Accounting Office): founded in 1921 and serves as an instrument of oversight through the evaluation of ongoing programs; has offices across the country and continually monitors a variety of projects; currently can only complete one to three technology assessments per year
  • Congressional Budget Office (CBO): created in 1974 to provide nonpartisan analyses needed for economic and budget decisions; S&T function is to evaluate the science-related budget requests for the Department of Energy, NIH, NSF, etc.
  • National Academy of Sciences: founded in 1863 by Abraham Lincoln to investigate, examine, experiment and report on any subject in the arts or sciences for any department of government; the National Research Council is part of this; criticisms of the academies include: timeliness, flexibility and bias and balance

Monday, November 26, 2007

Class 25: Wed Nov 28. Science and Technology in Europe, Japan, Korea and China

Ruttan—Technology, Growth and Development

  • Japanese innovation system—military industrial technonationalism
    • Goods promoted for strategic reasons- later became crucial to trade policy
    • Take-off in economic growth by 1880s—adapted borrowed technology
    • Adopted and adapted English textile system
      • 2 shifts/day, imported power loom, domestic production and repair shops
    • 4 elements of Japanese national technology system---(textile, steel, etc.)
      • Aggressive identification and transfer of tech from abroad
      • Strong public support for adoption & diffusion of new tech
      • Rapid adaptation of imported tech consistent with Japanese factor endowments and demand
      • Development of capacity to innovate and manufacture
    • Economic policies--- the “development state”
      • Encourage high rates of savings/investment
      • Discourage consumption
      • “technonationalism”: based on belief that technology is fundamental part in national security—it must be indigenized, diffused and nurture by gov’t to make nation rich and strong
        • Linked civilian and military tech
        • Not so much after WWII though
  • Japanese auto industry overtook Americanà smaller cars
    • Used direct technology transfer: help from foreign engineers and ties with foreign producers and manufacturers
    • And indirect technology transfer: import and reverse engineering
    • 4 key principles: NEWà new conception of market, approach to production management, way to think about human resources and way of organizing based on teams and groups
      • Developed flexible machinery—makes many parts
      • Perfect first time quality, elimination of waste, continuous improvement of production process
      • Lifetime employment guarantees—invest more in workers’ skills
      • Organized production into groups
      • “total quality control”—team given set of tasks then directed in how to do them—better response to change
      • Product development teams—less time/effort but better
      • Close grouping of suppliers and assemblers
      • Important points: constant purpose towards improvement, total quality management, no need for inspection, no more awarding on basis of price, constantly improve production, training on the job, develop leadership, drive out fear, no departmental barriers, no slogans or targets for work force, no work standards/quotas, pride of workmanship, program of education, everyone work for transformation
    • Japanese car exports to US ↑ as oil prices and power ↑
      • Protectionismà establishing factories in US and Europe
  • System targeted industries and attempted to catch up to leaders MITI system
    • Ministry of Trade and Industry--- eroded over time
    • “miracle” economic growth at first
    • Slowed b/c of energy crisis and environmental concerns
    • Later, more emphasis on science-based tech.—slowed growth
    • Needs to modernize financial institutions and liberalize market economy
      • Needs to create ideas instead of borrowing them
  • Germany—backward economy became reversed with modern research university
    • More focus on science, technology and education before mass production
    • Tech transfer from Great Britain and US and new institutional arrangements helped advance knowledge and technology
    • Many advancements compromised by WWI & WWII and aftermath
    • Reconstruction in 1950s—universities didn’t recover though
    • Auto industry developed later—copied Ford but not as cheap
      • Volkswagen emerged (inspired by Hitler)
      • Japanese cars moved ahead, responded with new luxury cars
      • Japanese caught up again though
    • Industrial cooperation and consolidation rather than competition
      • Should be able to revive industrial dynamism though
  • US system= mission oriented
    • Concentrate on science-based tech development on limited # of industries
  • German= diffusion oriented
    • Support for broad-based tech development throughout industrial system
  • Japan= both
    • Development concentrated on effort in a few important sectors but new institutional arrangements for rapid diffusion
  • 3 technological trajectory phases: emergence, consolidation, maturity
    • Emergence success needs ability to do sophisticated R&D across broad front and flexible financial institutions for new opportunities
    • Consolidation success needs ability to exploit new trajectories without getting actively involved in R&D and transfer resources
    • Maturity—need skilled labor force/production engineering to exploit
    • Don’t want concentration of capacity in any one stage
    • All 3 tech development systems will have trouble with this
      • Germany—move to consolidation/emergence of new trajectories?
      • Japan—innovation in product tech?
      • US—efficient enough to move from consolidation to maturity?
  • Japanese are better imitators because: culture of creative imitation, stronger emphasis on process not product development, incremental improvement not breakthrough
  • National technical innovational systems still important despite globalization
    • Still substantial differences among national systems
    • R&D dispersed differently in US, Japan, Germany

The National System for Innovation in Germany –Otto Keck

142-147

Technology Policy by Federal and State Governments

-Military R&D forbidden in West Germany by allied law until 1955. Military constituted 13% of total government R&D in Germany (1989).

Federal ministry for research and technology created in 1955—main spender in federal government R&D.

-until the 1970s the Federal Ministry for Research and technology regarded as successful. The ministry accepted because perceived importance of government support for industrial R&D as the key in modernizing the structure of industry. But AEG and Siemens developed their nuclear reactors mainly with their own funds.

-in the 1980s the failure of some large projects became obvious even to the general public.

New policies: cost sharing between government and private sector to avoid firms carrying out a project even if they expect it to have no commercial use. So the ministry started to finance between 30-70%.

-encourage firms to participate in cooperative projects, supporting research contracted by firms to other firms or to government labs.

-fraunhofer-society: large organization carrying out applied research mainly on contract with clients in industry and government.

-indirect government support: tax credits, subsidies, special depreciate rates fro investments in R&D (up to certain limit), subsidies for R&D personnel in small enterprises. ALL DISCONTINUED. Since 1983 support for newly created technology-oriented enterprises.

-institutional support by federal government heavily concentrated on national labs.

-shift in areas of technology priority: largest share now goes to space tech response to participation in Western European collaborative projects. Nuclear energy second, reduced by 35% since 1981. Also reduction in non-nuclear energy technology. Support for aircraft technology grown by 63% since 1981 to 777million Dm per year. Airbus—although can be regarded as technical success, had not crossed threshold to a commercial business.

-One major challenge for reform is higher education sector: need for closer coordination of government tech policies and education (various levels) policies.

-another problem: internalization of business: trend of firms locating diff activities in diff countries à government policies more regional to provide infrastructure and support systems that keep the country attractive for high-wage business activities.

Monday, November 12, 2007

CLASS 21: Wednesday, November 14, Proliferation of WMD

Thwarting Nuclear Terrorism --Glaser

  • Nuclear bomb that hit Hiroshima was made of Highly enriched Uranium (HEU) and had relatively simple “gun like mechanism” that triggered the explosion.
  • There is fear the terrorist group could acquire HEU and produce a nuclear bomb similar to the “simple” atom bomb that hit Hiroshima
  • HEU production is beyond state actors, but terrorist can acquire it through theft or black market
  • 50 tons of HEU in civilian use, 1/3 of which is in poorly guarded Russian research nuclear facilities
  • Best mean to prevent terrorist acquisition in the long run is to remove eliminate use of HEU
    • à convert reactors to low enriched uranium (LEU) (not usable in weapons)
  • 1990’s US and Russia began cooperating on retrieving and eliminating HEU stocks after HEU was stolen from Russian storage

  • Spent HEU fuel (from nuclear reactor) can also be used to make bombs
    • Spent HEU fuel is “self-protecting” for about 25 years: anyone close enough to manipulate the uranium will die within hours from the radiation.
      • After 25 years can be manipulated (though still dangerous)
  • US and Russia are (not very effectively) trying to get countries they provided with HEU to ship back the spent fuel
    • After 9/11 pressure on Department of Energy (DOE) intensified
      • Resulted in Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which is stepping up efforts to repatriate fresh and spent HEU fuel
  • Irony of the situation: US spends billions on missile defense system (to protect from conventional nuclear attack) but spends only $70 million to repatriate HEU (which is the best way to protect us from terrorist nuclear attacks)

  • Other sources of HEU fuel
    • Critical assembly reactors (CAR)
      • Mockup (small scale) reactors that test design of reactor
      • In Russia, CAR often have reserves of HEU (until recently some reserves were unguarded)
    • Pulsed reactors
      • Research reactors often used by military to test effects of intense reactions (simulate nuke) on various materials
      • Again reserve HEU is not well guarded

  • Solutions:
    • No more need for technologically obsolete research nuclear reactors: decommission them
    • Increase funding and high level government support
      • If task taken seriously, all civilian HEU could be removed in 5 to 8 years

"Kim's Big Fizzle", Scientific American (January 2007), pp. 18-20.

A summary of how nuclear implosion works: the detonators around the “core” sphere of plutonium or uranium go off at precisely the right time to create a spherical shock wave that compresses plutonium to 2-5 times, making the previously sub-critical mass super-critical. Even a mistake in timing of 100 nanoseconds can result in an explosion below optimum yield. The initiator is placed at the center of the bomb and ensures the neutron is released at the right time for optimum yield.

The desired plutonium is 239, but, especially if the plutonium came from nuclear fuel, too much plutonium 240 will be present. Plutonium 240 emits neutrons like crazy, so predetonation is likely to occur and a “fizzle” will occur

In the North Korean explosion, plutonium was used, but the bomb fizzled. As a result, it only yielded ½ a kiloton (500 tons of TNT equivalent). Most countries’ first nuclear bomb is between 5-25 kilotons, so the North Korean one was a relative failure (were expecting 4 kilotons). However, is still confirmed to be nuclear.

William J. Perry et al, "After the Bomb", New York Times (June 23, 2007), p. A23.

Focuses on what a state should do not to prevent a nuclear attack, but to deal with one afterwards – i.e. must make a contingency plan

1. the federal government, especially DoD, should take over and overrule any State authority

2. the federal government is the only one that can rationally deal with problem of radiation: everyone in the city center, if not killed by the blast, will die from radiation sickness (2-mile circle around ground zero)

3. the government should tell those around the fallout to stay in their basements for about three days

4. after this time period, people could leave their homes or stay depending on how much radiation they were willing to absorb – would not be lethal, but would increase risk of cancer from 20% (with no exposure) up to 30% (with greatest exposure)

5. same issue applies to first responders, therefore, government must notify people of how much radiation they will absorb

6. chance that terrorists will drop more weapons: evacuate other cities as much as possible to the countryside

7. government must figure out who is responsible for the bomb and cooperate with other governments if they are willing to cooperate (even if US thinks the terrorists got the bomb from Russia or Pakistan)

8. president, VP, speaker of House, majority leader of Senate, and chief justice of Supreme court (observer) should make plan of extreme surveillance measures that will be removed after crisis

9. can never be sure attack will not occur – must at least protect the existence of our constitutional government


David Albright, "When Will Iran Get the Bomb?", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July-August, 2006), pp. 26-37.

The CIA says Iran could likely get the bomb within the next 10 years. It all depends on how good their technology is.

Worst-case scenarios

If Iran decides to obtain highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use

in a nuclear weapon, its two most likely paths would be to develop

a clandestine or a “breakout” centrifuge enrichment capability. In

either worst-case estimate, the earliest Iran would have enough HEU

for a nuclear weapon would be in 2009.

Beginning of 2006–End of 2007

If the construction of a secret plant with 1,500–1,800 centrifuges

had begun in early 2006, its completion would not be likely before

the end of 2007.

Beginning of 2008–End of 2008

It would take approximately one year for this plant to produce

enough HEU for a nuclear weapon.

Beginning of 2009–Months later

Converting the HEU into weapon components would take a few

months, meaning the earliest Iran could have a nuclear weapon

would be sometime in 2009.

Late 2006–2009 or 2010

Iran has said it will begin installing 3,000 centrifuges in its

production-scale plant in late 2006. If there are no major delays,

this module could be complete in 2009 or 2010.

Months later

Centrifuges in the production-scale plant could be reconfigured

relatively easily to make HEU and could produce enough material

for a weapon in as little as a few months. Converting the HEU into

weapon components would take an additional few months.

    Alibek, Ken

    Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World—Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It

Overview:

The article discusses a biological weapon—anthrax—spill from a secret lab in Sverdlovsk during the Soviet Regime. Anthrax leaked out in April1979 after a worker failed to replace the air-filter which was the only thing containing the anthrax inside the secret lab. The accident was evidence of the Soviet violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Although they tried to cover it up, they failed.

Outline

    1. Outbreak in April 1979
    1. Worker fails to replace air-filter; anthrax enters into the night air
    1. In the next few days all the workers on the night shift of a ceramic-making plant across the street from the facility fell ill; within a week nearly all of them were dead
    1. Cover-Up
    1. The Soviet called it a ‘natural outbreak’ and blamed it on “bad meat” sold on the black market
      1. To make it more convincing, they rounded up and killed dogs that had supposedly eaten the bad meat from the markets
      2. They also put vendors selling the ‘supposedly bad meat in jail’
    1. Background on Sverdlovsk
    1. Soviet military industrial complex
      1. Built tanks, nuclear rockets, and other armaments as well as biological weapons
    1. Total damage done
    1. 96 people stricken and 66 died
    1. ‘small epidemic’ continued for months
    1. Other forms of anthrax
    1. Cutaneous form of anthrax
      1. Common; spread through contact with domestic cattle, sheep and goats by coming in contact w/open sores, cuts, etc.; treatable
    1. Pulmonary anthrax
      1. Most deadly; can be treated by injecting penicillin into blood before symptoms appear
        1. symptoms: shortness of breath, distinctive dark swellings along chest and neck
    2. Anthrax 836
      1. Most powerful strain which was collected from rats; viral strain developed due to a previous outbreak which leaked into the sewage systems
    3. Intestinal anthrax
      1. Claimed by KGB to have caused the problem in Sverdlovsk, but this was untrue
        1. accounts for less than 1% of cases
    1. Soviet and Anthrax Production
    1. Three cities: Sverdlovsk (later moved to Stepnogorsk in northern Kazakhstan), Penza, and Kurgan
    1. Biological weapons in high demand and considered more useful than dynamite
    1. Author meets Killer
    1. Author works for a plant where he meets Nikolai Chernyshov, the man responsible for the Sverdlovsk incident
    1. Chernyshov not punished because it would mean a loss in the confidentiality of certain events and persons
    2. Lack of responsibility and culture of ‘hide any damage or accidents’ developed
      1. Example where man drops a can of toxin on the ground and never tells anyone, but has the whole area quickly disinfected; no one gets sick
    1. Getting to the Truth
    1. Nine years later a group of Soviet medical experts arrive in the US to reveal the ‘truth’ of the 1979 event; yet they gave the same account/excuses as before but with more details
    1. Author refuses to sign away on ‘proposed lie’ to America
    2. Americans received and believed the story about ‘bad meat’!
    3. May 1993à interview w/ Boris Yelstin finally shed some light on the true events
    4. Yet in 1998, more articles published on re-affirming the ‘lie/story’ on ‘bad meat

Chapter 8 Progress

Overview

Talks about author’s job to improve the Stepnogorsk plant/research center to a degree that would allow it to replace Sverdlovsk.

--Anthrax 836 = powerful strain for use in warfare

--author’s assignment: created the world’s most efficient assembly line for the mass production of weaponized anthrax

--secretly transformed the a plant formerly used to make pesticides and ferilizers into one of six biowarfare facilities in the Soviet Union used to mobilize special production in the event of war; kept this secret from workers (or at least tried and had great success)

--ready to create strains of anthrax, tularemia and plague!

--Regan’s election to the White House led to huge mobilization and a heightened arms-race as many thought war imminent, especially since the US-backed forces in Afghanistan were killing Soviets and missiles were deployed by the U.S. in Europe that could reach Soviet soil

--author so nervous his ‘teeth grinding’ would keep his wife up at night; high security at plant he was in charge of

--counterintelligence chief left him uneasy


(96-99)

Anthrax

"By the time we finished our construction program at Stepnogorsk, the facility looked like the mountain of metal Tarasenko had warned me about." One building to analyze the decay rate and dissemination capacities of aerosol mixtures contained in germ bombs. The second building was for animal testing.

Process of "weaponizing" anthrax began with grains of freeze-dried bacteria kept in stoppered vials.

One of the central challenges of bio-weaponeering is to find the right temperatures at which different pathogenic microorganisms can grow rapidly without being cooked to death. (Similar to vaccine creation.)

"A bioweaponeer works with recipes." The raw ingredients are similar, but quantities and combinations of nutrient media, heat, and time vary. If it overheats, you have sto start all over! Each generation of bacteria is transferred into a larger vessel. Once they reach maximum concentration, they are passed through a centrifuge to be concentrated as much as thirty times further. (This centrifuge resembles the separators used to make milk... The tech. itself was produced by a dairy plant in Tula, south of Moscow.)

The pathogen then has to be mixed with additives to stabilize it over a long period (another "patented" element of the process?). The final formulation is sent through underground pipes to a building where it's filtered into the munitions carrier. (Likens the machines that execute this task to those used in soft drink bottling plants!) By 1987, the combined production capacity of the anthrax lines was nearly 5,000 tons a year.

(107-115)

Smallpox

Viruses: Structurally simpler than bacteria, but are capable of annihilating the most sophisticated biological systems. Virulence, contagiousness. Programmed for its own procreation, but it needs a host cell.

Human immune system as "an army with scouts and infantrymen, naval and air power, a sophisticated information network, and a carefully delineated command structure."

T-cells: The scouts, on the lookout for foreign substances.


Of all viruses, smallpox has left the oldest and the deepest scars. Ravaged 18th century Europe, decimated the Native Americans. Comes from the pox family of viruses, which assaults the upper respiratory tract. Stages:

  1. high fever, vomiting, headache, strange stiffness
  2. small spots develop, rash around face.
  3. rash spreads, painful blisters
  4. scabs linger, dry, and fall off, leaving scars
  5. sometimes fatal (3-4 days)

1796 - British physician Edward Jenner injects an 8-year-old with material taken from the lesions of a milkmaid who had contracted a mild form of pox virus from cows. Two months later, he inoculated the boy with smallpox, but he didn't contract the disease. Which was good, because that could've been awkward.

1980 - WHO announces eradication of smallpox; no more need for immunization programs. Two stockpiles left (Atlanta and Moscow).

Moscow proposed the crusade against smallpox but simultaneously developed it as a weapon. In 1981, they renewed intense work on a better version of the weapon!

1947: first smallpox weapons factory outside the ancient cathedral town of Zagorsk. They injected the virus into chicken eggs, let it take over the host, and poured the resulting liquid into huge vats. (This is all actually in the text by the way.) Hundreds of thousands of nearby collective farms were consigned to Zagorsk's weapons-assembly lines. In 1959, there was a breakout of incredibly virulent strain of smallpox in India, so it was collected and reproduced in the USSR.

A 20-ton stockpile of smallpox in the USSR was renewed annually.

Some scientists consider smallpox an unlikely weapon, however, since humans are the virus's only natural hosts, and since quarantine and vaccination could preclude an epidemic.

The Allies gave up on weaponizing viruses, but not the USSR. They were valuable munitions; you could do a lot with just a little. But the Allies efficiently produced vaccines while "we" inefficiently produced the virus.

(163-167)

The Plague

Nothing really new here... same kind of story that he tells in the other two parts. Talks about boubles and how bad the plague is, then criticizes the US for giving up on what is actually a relatively easy process of culturing various forms of the plague and maintaining its killing capacity. The USSR "persevered."


The future of arms control—Levi and O’Hanlon.

Chapter 1

· Cold war arms control:

o Removed areas of possible military competition that could have been hard for either superpower to resist had the other not done so too (i.e. outer space, Antarctica)

o Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty reduced danger of crisis turning into hot war

· However, countries later came to testing nuclear weapons, despite existence of regulations.

o Eventually, US rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was rescinded as well

· Bush administration proposed to prohibit access to nuclear power technologies that could also be used in nuclear weapon programs by countries not already possessing technologies

o Adopted the option of preventive war for thwarting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (strategy: preemption)

· Arms control cannot provide absolute guarantees that countries will not acquire or sell dangerous materials, but can provide disincentives to such action

o Make it more difficult to carry them out

o Make it easier to detect illicit activity

o Thus establishing predicates for coercive action

· Arms control should be viewed as a complement to coercive action, not as a substitute for it

· Universal standards do not directly dissuade extremist states from pursuing weapons of mass destruction, but they can help the US and international community confront them when they do, making it harder for them to succeed

· Arms control should focus on nuclear and biological arms to prevent their spread to most dangerous actors, extremist states and terrorist organizations à reduce inclination to seek dangerous arms and increase willingness to stop countries so inclined

o Provide early warning of when and where outlaw regimes acquire weapons

o Integrate coercive enforcement action more intimately into its structure, to respond to situations in which extremist regimes or terrorist groups are detected pursuing illicit weapons and to deter them entirely

o Harmonize with broader American foreign policy to help most states feel greater confidence in their own security

· Arms control needs priorities: should attempt to prevent spread of dangerous materials

· Arms control should produce transparency and early warning: goal of arms control should be to enable early detection of dangerous detections, by means of cooperative or coercive tools

· Arms control should be a complement to military force

· Arms control must address security of nations that do not have weapons of mass destruction:

o US and allies should create new security guarantees and perhaps new alliance systems, tailored to specific circumstances, for democratic, peaceful countries

o Arms control explicitly linked to security policy

· Arms Control Criteria for today’s world:

o Goal: deter proliferation before it occurs

o Arms control must encompass not only cooperative arrangements among adversaries, but also cooperative arrangements among friends

o E.g. US now pursues arms control with Russia to keep Russia’s weapons out of the hands of terrorists

o Future of arms control: based on problem of weak states and dangerous non-state actors, not competition between great powers

Chapter 2

Traditional strategic arms control not as important for the future
Argument for traditional strategic arms control—irrelevant now
Weapon can stabilize relationship
Arms reductions must be verifiable or transparent
Advances in US-USSR relationship may make it easier to progress in other relationships
Continued reductions can help diminish important of nuclear weapons for security
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—end of complete disarmament is unrealistic
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is worthwhile—not necessary though
Same benefits if we condemn testing
Shouldn’t restrict arms in space
State of nuclear relations among great states is sound---no upset
Arms control okay right now (US and Russia)—little gain from pushing it farther
Proliferation increase not likely if downward trends of US/Rus. Continue
Can’t have arsenal too low though—China might try to compete
China has more to worry about with US (over Taiwan) than Russia does
Size and character of US missile defense WILL matter now & in future
Important to abstain for nuclear weapons and downplay their role in US doctrine
If not---could lead to more proliferation
Seen as militarily important or weakened taboo against them
4 primary types of new nuclear weapons proposed:
Low-yield weapons, earth-penetrating weapons, enhanced radiation weapons, and agent-defeat weapons
Low-yield weapons: bombs that explode in air- power 100x smaller than Hiroshima
Could fill gap between least powerful nuclear weapons & most powerful conventional weapons
US unlikely to launch nuclear weapons w/o these b/c too much damage
Scary enemy but are a more credible threat
However, void doesn’t really appear to be there-not really valid argument
Earth-penetrating weapons: “bunker-busters”-not fall out free but reduce it
Increase destructive depth—could double that of current arsenal
Better deterrence & could destroy WMD attack coming from deep bunker
BUT: only increase by factor of 2—enemy could easily dig deeper
Fallout reduction only useful if between far and urban area-unlikely
Enhanced radiation weapons: “neutron bombs”
Kill enemies with radiation but preserve physical infrastructure
Considered (and rejected) for against Soviets—not rational today though
Agent-defeat weapons
Designed to penetrate facilities holding chemical/biological weapons and incinerate them—prevents spread
Need really good intelligence to destroy targets
Might actually eject some of the agents before neutralizing them
Conventional weapons could probably do this too
US should emphasize conventional ability and that it won’t strike first
CTBT—signing would show belief that nuclear arms less valuable
Bans all nuclear explosions by member states or within their jurisdictions
GOALS: prevent non-nuclear states from getting nuclear weapons and prohibit weapons states from improving arsenals
Stop development -not crude weapons—get India, Israel, Pakistan to join?
Needs to be ratified by all members of UN conference on disarmament or states with nuclear reactors (44)
Opponent arguments:
Endangers safety/reliability of US nuclear arsenal
Not a verifiable treaty
False sense of security—if want to test may withdraw or violate
Prevents US from developing new warhead types
BUT: No real need to test though
Ability to cheat severely limited and hard to enforce
One possibility of arms control: de-alert forces
Worries that de-alerting forces will lead to weakened deterrence
Argument for de-alerting only some forces
In terms of space, US stands to lose the most from weaponization
Most against it--- China, UN, Russia
Some US defense planners think it will ensure US dominance
Some argue space is already partially weaponized--long-range rockets, etc.
Space as a sanctuary???
US looks to have wide range of offensive/defensive tech for space in future--- show we agree to restraints now then?
Are treaties even worth negotiating?
Need confidence-building measures and informal understandings
OVERALL: shouldn’t be top priority of the US in the future
Should try to keep the status quo for as long as possible
Prohibitions--- ban all activities in space in terms of ASATs all together
Flaws: hard to ensure something isn’t ASAT
Cant stop some types of missile defense from being used as ASAT
Not sure US will benefit from ASAT ban forever
Better to ban Earth-attack weapons in space
Could also do temporary prohibitions, bans on testing/deployment above set altitude, ban on ASATs that produce debris
Confidence-building measures: establish rules for using military assets
Ex: keep-out zones around satellites—hard to enforce though
Wouldn’t really limit military capabilities
Good idea but not worth a great deal of time
Advance notice of space launches—makes sense
Questionable though—payloads not always obviously for ASATs
Marginally useful—don’t stop but make weaponizing more difficult
Informal, unilateral (but possibly reciprocated) restraints
Quicker and more flexible--- buy time
Applicable mostly to R&D
BUT if change would cause alarm and risk

Chapter 3. Preventing Nuclear proliferation

  • Perfect defense against nuclear attack is not technically feasible. Meaningful mitigation of consequences is impossible
  • Today little danger either US or Russia will use nukes. Primary worry over terrorists.
  • Current control of spread of nuclear arms flawed in 4 ways:
    1. too little warming of proliferation developments
    1. lack of means for enforcing agreements
    2. little incentive for states to forgo nukes
    3. do too little to stop terrorists, as opposed to states, from acquiring nukes.
  • All states should be required to accept tougher broader inspections.
  • Coercive dimension of arms control must be extended building on bush’s proliferation security initiative. Extend agreement to bind all states through a security council resolution.
  • Agree in advance on when coercive instruments ranging from interdiction to sanctions to force should be used. And force should not be used strictly as a last resort.
  • Give states reason to comply: rewards that don’t address national security in states will not be effective. US should develop alliances and security guarantees with more countries—require major commitments and investments but broadly consistent with American foreign policy of post WWII era.
  • This would not preclude use of nonaggression pledges as part of nonproliferation deals in difficult circumstances.
  • Important to better secure existing nuclear materials as well. Should declare a deterrent policy promising extremely severe repercussions for any country found to have export weapons or materials to countries that would provide terrorists with nuclear weapons.

    The ultimate terrorists—Jessica Stern

    Pg. 1-10.

    • A nuclear attack on the Empire State building or elsewhere might evoke measures that will violate civil rights. Within days the American way of life might change substantially.
    • Fear of radiation might cause panic, which could lead to death (accidents from people trying to rush out of the city even w/o evacuation)
    • US department of energy predicts that nuke would cuase very few deaths from cancer but economic and psychological damage formidable—people stay indoors for undefined period afterward to avoid exposure to fallout.
    • Biological weapons have potential to be as deadly as nukes but easier to accomplish. Compare anthrax (100 kilograms) would kill up to 3 million people, where hydrogen bomb could kill between 600,000 and 2 million.
    • Vulnerable societies: modern societies are particularly suspetible to weapons that are capable of killing many people at once. In modern societies terrorists go unnoticed because of personal isolation. Internet provides easy way for terrorists to spread information around the world.
    • US may have contributed to terrorist violence by training and financing the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan’s war with the Soverit Union in the 1980s, leaving militants dispersed.
    • Christian Patiots growing in number, showing signs of interest in biological weapons. Survivalists and white supremacists implicated in three separate cases involving biological agents in 1995.
    • Why now? 5 risks increased the risk of terrorist attacks against civilian targets:
    1. valuable to terrorists seeking to conjure sense of divine retribution, evoke dread or retaliate against states that have used WMD in the past.
    1. changing motivations: religious groups becoming more common and are more violent than secular groups.
    2. black market offers weapons and components and knowhows after the breakup of the soviet union.
    3. chemical and biological weapons proliferating in states known to sponsor terrorism. China Russia and N Korea are exporting equipment intended for benign purposes but could be used to manufacture WMD.
    4. advances in technology have made terrorism with weapons of mass destruction easier to carry out. The Internet, fermenting equipment (although tech also makes hunting down terrorism easier).
    • Despite these developments terrorist use of WMD likely to remain rare.
    • While the probability of WMD terrorism is low the expected cost is devastating.