Class 19 Wed Nov 7: Impact of New Technology on Conventional and Asymmetric Warfare

Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer,"

National Interest, 37, 30‑42 (Fall 1994). History of past revolutions in military affairs.

· Military revolution: occurs when the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict

o 4 elements: technological change, systems development, operational innovation, organizational adaptation

o Produces increase in combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces

o Does not simply characterize a new innovation, but the dramatic effects of it

o No common transition period from one military regime to another

§ Depends on competition of major players internationally

§ Recent transition periods range from 10 to 20 years à more of a continuous evolution

· Military revolution characterized by changes in character of conflict à requires equally dramatic/radical changes in military doctrine and organization

History of Ten Revolutions since 14^th century:

· Hundred Years’ War à

o Infantry Revolution: infantry replaced dominant role of heavy cavalry on battlefield

§ Spurred by development of lowgbow

o Artillery Revolution: gunpowder artillery, cannons

§ Expensive endeavor; thus, richer states could exploit Artillery Revolution to subdue weaker neighbors

· 16^th century à

o Fortress Revolution: involved construction of a new style of defensive fortification employing lower, thicker walls with a defensive fortification system

§ Expensive, therefore revert back to infantry

o Gunpowder Revolution: artillery and musket fire on battlefield (no more longbows)

o Napoleonic Revolution: French standardized artillery calibers, carriages, and equipment (interchangeable parts); also increased mobility

· Between Napoleonic Wars and American Civil War à

o Land Warfare Revolution: introduction of railroads and telegraphs, and widespread rifling of muskets and artillery changed way military forces organized, equipped, and employed to achieve max military effectiveness

§ Increased ability to amass forces quickly and coordinate widely dispersed operations more effectively (better communication)

o Naval Revolution: metal-hulled ships powered by turbine engines and armed with long-range rifled artillery; transform war at sea

§ Later moved to steam propulsion and screw propellers

· WWI à

o Interwar Revolutions in Mechanization, Aviation, and Information

§ Land forces employed new military systems based on advances in fields of mechanization and radio

§ Also advances in internal combustion engines, aircraft design, radar à blitzkrieg, carrier aviation, aerial attacks

· mid-20^th century à

o Nuclear Revolution: nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles allow for near-instantaneous and complete destruction of state’s economic and political fabric

§ Utility comes more in deterring war once countries were able to stockpile such radical weapons

· Numerous revolutions came about after several years due to competition between nations. Without newer innovations, certain countries would perpetually be at a disadvantage

Seven Lessons

· Emerging technologies only make military revolutions possible

· Competitive advantages of military revolution are increasingly short-lived

o Military organization derives advantage by having first access to new technologies à therefore must exploit technologies quickly before competitions have the chance

· Asymmetries in national objectives and strategic cultures, as well as limitations on resources and the potential number and strength of enemies, allow for niche competitors

o Technological change has been increasing and broadening à lots of potential military innovations

o Cost of competing limits how military organization will pursue competition

· Historical record suggests that war and revolution in warfare are quite separate entities

o A confirming war is not essential for military organizations to seize opportunities for military innovations

· Although most militaries will be quick to recognize a competitor’s advantage, there are no certainties

o Not even war will guarantee that all military organizations will recognize and exploit a military revolution, or even fully understand it

o It is perceptions of future contingencies and likely enemies that determine whether and when there is full exploitation of advantages offered by military revolution

· Technologies that underwrite a military revolution are often originally developed outside the military sector, and then “imported” and exploited for their military applications

o Having a substantially inferior economic and industrial base is not necessarily an absolute barrier to competition in military revolution

· Military revolution does not imply a major leap in cost of maintaining military forces

The Current Revolution is at its early stages

· Gulf War showed glimpse of potential influence of emerging technologies and new military systems

o Will involve great increases in ability of military organizations to detect, identify, track, and engage with a high degree of precision and lethality far more targets, over a far greater area, in a far shorter period of time, than was possible in Cold War era

§ Thus lead to systems and operations designed to offset these capabilities

§ Improved ability to understand target systems and relationship to strategic objectives

o Growing importance of simulations

· US should anticipate an increase in competitors who want to exploit the impending development of military potential

· Military organizations that are highly innovative and adaptive compete best in periods of military revolution

Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle

P132-149

Operation Desert Storm

• Desert Storm’s most important single feature is that it won with an unprecedentedly low loss rate: 795,000 coalition troops destroyed Iraqi army of hundreds of thousands with loss of 240 attackers. Set new benchmark.
• Massive 6-week air campaign→month of uncontested pounding of ground targets→coalition ground forces secretly redeployed.
• Weapon tech in desert storm strongly favored the coalition.
• Coalition clearly outnumbered Iraqis, even though exact numbers not known.
• Defensive operations: Iraqi defense no modern system tactics: no concealment, cover, independent small-unit, maneuver, combined arms integration
• Offensive operations: modern-system precepts on the Coalitions part. Methods reduced US vulnerability to Iraqi power.
• New theory: technology magnifies the effects of force employment.
• New air technology with new target acquisition and precision guidance systems broke Iraqi resistance through will and means.
• New ground technology with thermal sights, new armor, stabilized 120-mm guns, uranium ammunition allowed coalition to strike Iraqi from advantageous distance and directions. New theory suggests that tech magnifies the effects of force employment (punishing Iraqi exposure with increased severity)
• New theory attributes dessert storm’s extremity to interaction between force employment and new technology: combination of modern-system offensive methods, non-modern defensive methods, and advanced technology yielded unprecedented low loss rate despite attempted resistance by sizeable Iraqi forces

House: Combined Arms

• First warriors fought on foot with stones, clubs, etc.
• Domestication of draft animals—horseback/chariots
• Learned to overlap shields=phalanx
• Individual lost out to unit
• Phalanx had vulnerabilities though and lost out to Macedonians
• Macedonians- phalanxes with cavalrymen and dismounted runners
• Succeeded by Romans
• Used small phalanxes with checkerboard formation
• Small # of horsemen and mechanical devices too
• Tools to construct temporary fortresses
• 4 basic branches of combat arms
• Infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers
• Invention of stirrup gave cavalry more stable fighting platform
• Armored knight= formidable but foot soldiers still existed
• Phalanx and legion used with projectile weapons (longbow/firearms)
• Individual craftsmen and types of warriors couldn’t compete with specialization of labor w/many different capabilities in efficient organization
• Combat arms—deployment, maneuver and interaction of different specialists
• Only one art--- combined arms (Maj. Gerald Gilbert)
• Combat arms of infantry, artillery, cavalry and engineers used to operate separately with small groups
• Specific function for each—senior commanders only coordinated efforts
• Now we combine arms at lower levels
• Combine actions to maximize all effects
• Mix of different weapons always superior to one type
• Criticized that many armies still in specialized battalions (peace time)
• Easier for repair and maintenance
• Training more effective
• No permanent combined arms organization equally prepared for all circumstances—need to tailor for specific situations
• Combined arms
• Different combat arms and weapons systems must be used in concert to maximize the survival and combat effectiveness of others
• Combat arms and weapons:
• Infantry (mechanized, motorized, airborne, air assault, light, special operations units), armor, reconnaissance/cavalry, artillery, antitank weapons, air defense or antiaircraft forces, combat engineers/sappers, attack helicopters, ground-attack aircraft, electronic warfare, guerilla forces, nuclear/chemical weapons
• Combat support
• Intelligence, communications, chemical decontamination crews, smoke generators, military police, construction engineers
• Service/logistical support elements
• Transportation, maintenance, supply, medical, personnel, finance
• Essential to victory in sustained combat
• 2^nd meaning: combined arms organization
• Command and communications structure that brings different weapons together for combat
• Permanent, peace-time organizations or ad hoc/task-organization combos in wartime (combat team/task force)
• 3^rd meaning: tactics and operations
• Actual roles performed and techniques applied by different arms and weapons support one another in battle
• 3 different levels of war
• Tactics: process of combining different arms and services to win a battle
• Strategy: plans and actions that directly contribute to outcome of the war
• Intermediate level=operational art/operation level of war: sequencing steps, coordinating actions and battles to achieve the strategic goal
• Defined in terms of purposes/objectives rather than by organizational level
• Tactical warfare= combo of three elements
• Mobility—capacity to maneuver and concentrate forces over varied terrain and ability to move men and units when exposed to enemy’s weapons
• Measured relative to other forces and difficulty of terrain
• Protection- security against enemy surprise attack and safeguards to allow troops to attack or defend on the battlefield
• Defensive fortifications, natural or artificial means
• Offensive power—needed to impose will on enemy and relies on firepower of modern weapons to overcome enemy’s protection
• Includes psychological ascendancy of troops toward enemy
• 3 interact continually throughout history—big increase in firepower lately
• Only overcome with combo of protection and firepower
• Ex: defensive system of WWI—trench warfare
• Combos either supplementary or complementary in effects
• Supplementary—combined arms increase effect of one weapon system or arm by adding similar effects of other weapons and arms
• Complementary—combine different effects so together they pose a more complicated threat—dilemma for the enemy
• Orchestrating battle requires:
• Organization and doctrine
• Reflect how an army expects to fight
• Must be flexible with mixture
• Shared terminology and concepts of how organization will function/ common set of procedures and frame of reference for dealing with each situation—understood by all soldiers
• 3 stages of doctrine/organization adjustment for new weapons
• Cannot find organizational/doctrinal home for new weapon
• Enthusiasts try to make weapon into separate combat arm
• New weapon becomes member of combined arms team
• Shared concept of integration for weapon into other arms and services
• Training
• Practice needed at all levels to perform complex tasks under any conditions
• More dependence on junior leaders
• Command, control, communications
• Mechanisms by which commander directs battle
• Torn between two extremes: stay back to communicate or go up front to lead by example
• Control includes standardized procedures and trained staff leaders
• Takes time—to get info, assess, decide, coordinate, launch
• 2 problems:
• Situation may change
• One side may have faster decision process
• “turning inside the enemy’s decision cycle”
• Motivation
• Intelligent courage
• Willingness to risk lives for a cause
• Conclusion
• Individual weapons do not win wars
• Major armies integrate more arms and services at progressively lower levels of organization to combine different capabilities of mobility, protection and firepower while posing more complicated threats
• Easier to divide up large combined arms units than attach smaller elements
• Enduring value of division command structure that can plan, identify critical info, and react quickly
• All elements must be able to work toward common goal w/ min. guidance
• Information warfare
• Technologies than can accelerate/retard decision-making cycle of commander and staff
• Ex: GPS
• If use this, need:
• All arms and services to have same mobility and similar armor protection
• Arms must be balanced within organization grouped to perform to a particular doctrine
• Test of ability: defense against enemy penetration and exploitation
• Stop it but also continue to fight if it happens
• High degree of training fundamental for all situations
• Aircraft still not fully integrated into the combined arms team
• Must look to see how two services combine to accomplish higher level goals
• Sophistication and complexity in military units are worthless if can’t deploy quickly and sustain operations
• Can dismantle combined arms team—not such a good idea though